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Passive scheme analysis for solving untrusted source problem in quantum key distribution
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As a practical method, the passive scheme is useful to monitor the photon statistics of an untrusted source
in a Plug & Play quantum key distribution (QKD) system. In a passive scheme, three kinds of monitor mode
can be adopted: average photon number (APN) monitor, photon number analyzer (PNA), and photon number
distribution (PND) monitor. In this paper, the security analysis is rigorously given for the APN monitor, while
for the PNA, the analysis, including statistical fluctuation and random noise, is addressed with a confidence level.
The results show that the PNA can achieve better performance than the APN monitor and can asymptotically
approach the theoretical limit of the PND monitor. Also, the passive scheme with the PNA works efficiently
when the signal-to-noise ratio (RSN) is not too low and so is highly applicable to solve the untrusted source
problem in the QKD system.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) establishes two parties
(Alice and Bob) to share a secure key [1–6]. The single-
photon BB84 protocol [1] for ideal [7–9] and practical (im-
perfect single-photon source, channel and detection) [10, 11]
QKD systems has proved to be unconditionally secure in
the last decade. To efficiently apply the security analysis of
[10, 11], it is better that the photon-number distribution (PND)
of the source is fixed and known to Alice and Bob, while
Eve cannot control and change it. This kind of source is de-
fined as a “trusted source” [see Fig. 1(a)]. Due to channel loss
and the multiphoton states of the trusted source, Eve can per-
form the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [12–14] with-
out causing any disturbances and obtain full information from
the keys generated by the multiphoton states. Thus, all the
losses and errors are pessimistically assumed from the single-
photon state of trusted source and the secure key rate of QKD
is reduced. Fortunately, with the decoy-state method [15–19],
the properties of the quantum channel are characterized by Al-
ice and Bob, thereby higher secure key rate can be achieved
[6], which has been successfully implemented in experiments
for QKD with trusted source [20–23].
However, it was recently found that the characteristics of
the QKD source need to be verified in a real-life experi-
ment [24–34]. For example, the intensity fluctuation from
the source makes the assumption of the trusted source fail in
decoy-state protocol, for which a rigorous security analysis
has been given [25, 27, 28]. Especially, the assumption of a
trusted source does not hold in the round-way “Plug & Play”
system [35], in which Bob sends to Alice a train of bright laser
pulses which can be eavesdropped and controlled by Eve.
Even though Alice can use a time (frequency) -domain filter
and phase randomizer [36] to assure the mixture of single-
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FIG. 1: (a) Scheme of “trusted source”. (b) Scheme of “untrusted
source”.
mode Fork states [24, 29, 30], the PND of classically mixed
states is under Eve’s control provided that Eve has the power
of a quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement [37] and
then she can know the photon number of each pulse sent to
Alice’s station. This kind of source is defined as an “untrusted
source” [see Fig. 1(b)]. Note that Alice’s filters, phase ran-
domizer and encoder exist in Alice’s side which are not shown
in Fig. 1(b). Through QND in Fig. 1(b), Eve knows the exact
photon number at position 1, which may assist her PNS attack
at position 2 [29].
For applying the BB84 protocol in the experiment, an av-
erage photon number (APN) monitor for an untrusted source
was proposed [35]. However, until now no quantitative and/or
detailed analysis to prove the effectiveness of the method was
reported. For keeping the efficient decoy-state analysis for
an untrusted source, it was proposed to estimate the lower and
upper bounds of a few parameters about the PND at position 2
in Fig. 1(b) [25, 27, 28]. Recently, the detector-decoy scheme
was theoretically proposed to monitor the PND of untrusted
source using a threshold detector [31]. From another view-
point, an active scheme of the photon number analyzer (PNA)
is put forward [29] even though it is hard to put into reality
[30]. In a recent work, a passive scheme of PNA was pro-
posed and experimentally tested though some practical issues
2FIG. 2: The passive scheme using a beam splitter (BS, transmittance:
tB), a detector (efficiency: tD), an attenuator (transmittance: λ), and
an encoder. Here, the imperfect detector is modeled by a virtual at-
tenuator between P3 and P4 (transmittance: tD) and an ideal detector
(efficiency: 100%). The encoder is used for phase coding.
(e.g., statistical fluctuation and detection noise) were not con-
sidered [30].
In the following, the security analysis is made for the APN
monitor and the PNA. For the PNA, some practical issues,
such as statistical fluctuation due to a finite number of mea-
surements (estimated by the Clopper-Pearson confidence in-
terval [38, 39]) and two kinds of additive detection noise
(Poissonian and Gaussian electronic noise) are analyzed. It
shows that the PNA has better enhancement in a secure key
rate than the APN monitor and so is more applicable in BB84
protocol.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR THE APN MONITOR
A passive scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 where the detector
is limited to monitor the APN (µ) of the untrusted source and
an attenuator (transmittance: λ) is used to ensure the weak
pulses with the fixed APN (such as 0.1). This simple intensity
monitor has been implemented to a practical “Plug & Play”
system [35]. Applying the BB84 protocol without the decoy
states, the security analysis of the untrusted source is pre-
sented below. For convenience, in the following discussion,
Pi with i = 1, . . ., refers to the position i. In Fig. 2, the pho-
toelectron number distribution D(m) at P4 and the PND P(n2)
at P2 are the Bernoulli transform of PND P(n1) at P1, that is
D(m) = B[P(n1), ξ] =
∞∑
n1=m
P(n1)
(
n1
m
)
ξm(1 − ξ)n1−m, (1)
P(n2) = B[P(n1), η] =
∞∑
n1=n2
P(n1)
(
n1
n2
)
ηn2 (1 − η)n1−n2 , (2)
where η = λ(1 − tB) and ξ = tBtD. In practice, the intensity
monitor of the detector only gives 〈m〉 = ∑∞m=0 mD(m). How-
ever, based on Eq. (1), µ = 〈n1〉 = 〈m〉/ξ is known if 〈m〉 and
ξ are both exactly known. Then, from Eq. (2), the APN 〈n2〉
(= ηµ) at P2 can be derived. From the work of GLLP, BLMS:
see authors of Refs. [11, 13], Alice should estimate the up-
per (lower) bound of multiphoton (single-photon) probability
at P2. For the untrusted source only under Alice’s APN mon-
itor, Eve can arbitrarily manipulate P(n1) with the constrains
of
∑∞
n1=0 n1P(n1) = µ and
∑∞
n1=0 P(n1) = 1. Eve chooses the
optimal P(n1) to maximize the multiphoton probability at P2
for eavesdropping more information by the PNS attack. Al-
ice has to estimate the worst case and the upper bound of the
multiphoton probability is estimated at P2, which is
P(n2 > 1) =
∞∑
n1=2
P(n1)
(
n1
2
)
η2(1 − η)n1−2 + · · ·
= a2P(n1 = 2) + · · · + akP(n1 = k) + · · · ,
(3)
where ak = 1−(1−η)k−kη(1−η)k−1 (k ≥ 2). Thus, to estimate
the worst case, one needs to solve the convex optimization
[40] or linear program (LP) problem which has the form
minimize − cT x,
subject to Ax = b, x ≥ 0, (4)
where
x =
[
P(n1 = 0) P(n1 = 1) P(n1 = 2) · · · P(n1 = k) · · ·
]T
,
cT =
[
0 0 a2 · · · ak, · · ·
]
,
A =
[
0 1 2 · · · k · · ·
1 1 1 · · · 1 · · ·
]
,
b =
[
µ
1
]
. (5)
The LP problem can be solved by using the simplex method
[41] and the maximum value Pn2>1 of cT x is given as
Pn2>1 =
aksµ
ks
, (6)
where aks/ks is the maximum value of ak/k, and the op-
timal P(n1) of the untrusted source for Eve has the form[
P(n1 = 0) = 1 − µ/ks, P(n1 = ks) = µ/ks, P(n1 , 0, ks) = 0].
For example, if η = 0.001 and µ = 100 are fixed,
the simplex method gives that Pn2>1 = 0.02985 when
P(n1 = 0) = 1 − µ/1794, P(n1 = 1794) = µ/1794, and
P(n1 , 0, 1794) = 0.
For an error-free setup with Bob’s perfect detection (100%
detection efficiency and no dark counts), the necessary condi-
tion for security is [13]
∆ =
Pn2>1
Qe < 1, (7)
where Qe is the total expected probability of detection events
and ∆ is the upper bound of tagged signal probability [11].
Otherwise, Eve can suppress the single-photon signals com-
pletely and obtain full information on the multiphoton sig-
nals. In the “Plug & Play” system, the expected photon
3source entering Alice’s side is Poissonian with APN µ (i.e.,
Qe = 1 − e−µηη f ). Here, η f = 10−α′L/10 is the transmittance of
communication fiber with the loss α′ (0.21 dB/km@1550 nm)
and the length L. With µ = 100, η = 0.001, α′ = 0.21, and
Pn2>1 = 0.02985, by Eq. (7), the secure transmission distance
L < 24.7 km. Note that, in the same setup, if Alice success-
fully monitors the PND of the untrusted source at P1 or P2 and
Eve does not replace the Poissonian source, the secure trans-
mission distance L < 63 km. Generally, for a practical “Plug
& Play” setup with quantum bit error rate (QBER) Ee, the se-
cure key rate for an untrusted source with the APN monitor
is
R ≥
1
2
Qe
{
− f (Ee) H2(Ee) + (1 − ∆)
[
1 − H2
(
Ee
1 − ∆
)]}
, (8)
where f (Ee)H2(Ee) is the leakage information in the error cor-
rection and H2(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x). From the
above analysis, one cannot find the secure key rate through 67
km fiber in [35].
The APN monitor does not require high detector resolu-
tion. In the experiment, an optical power meter records the
time average of the total pulse energy during one fixed period
and is commonly used to monitor the mean optical power or
APN 〈m〉. Due to finite average time, the measured values
of the power meter may statistically fluctuate between differ-
ent periods. Thus, one of the records from the power meter
cannot represent the real 〈m〉 unless it has an infinite average
time. However, when the running time of the QKD system is
much longer than the average time of the power meter and the
large number of records from the power meter are obtained,
approximately, the mean of these records obeys the normal
distribution according to the central limit theorem (CLT) [42].
Through the mean and variance of these records, the real 〈m〉
can be statistically estimated in an interval [〈m〉L, 〈m〉U] with
a confidence level [42]. Further, with the same confidence
level, µ ∈ [µL, µU] can be estimated, where µL = 〈m〉L/ξ
and µU = 〈m〉U/ξ. From Eq. (6), Pn2>1 can be estimated by
aksµ
U/ks.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR THE PNA
The passive setup in Fig. 2 can realize the PNA which leads
to different analysis results [29]. By replacing the parameter λ
and randomly choosing the vacuum state and the signal (weak
decoy) state with λs (λd), the three-intensity decoy-state pro-
tocol can be applied [30].
The PNA needs to estimate the lower bound of the fraction
1 − δ of the photon pulses (defined as “untagged bits” and are
originally referred to as P1 in Fig. 2 [29]), and the photon
number N of which falls in the preset range of [Nmin, Nmax].
To estimate 1 − δ, a detector needs to monitor the PND at P4,
which is used to yield that at P1 using the inverse-Bernoulli
transform [30]. Another important parameter to estimate the
secure key rate is the transmittance λA for “untagged bits” in
Alice’s side [for those at P1, λA = (1 − tB)λ].
The effectiveness of inverse-Bernoulli-transform algorithm
is sensitive to the statistical fluctuation and the detection noise,
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FIG. 3: A two-threshold detection for the PNA. The integrator con-
verts the photoelectron number m to the voltage v. C1 (C2): com-
parator. “11” output from C1 and C2 means the voltage v between
v1 and v2 and the photon number m falls in the range [m1,m2], corre-
spondingly.
and high-resolution detection is required. To implement the
passive scheme more robustly, the detection mode at P4 needs
to be simplified, and the effects of statistical fluctuation and
the detection noise need to be included in the security analy-
sis. In doing so, a two-threshold detection illustrated in Fig. 3
is used and the position of “untagged bits” is redefined. In
Fig. 3, through an integrator, the voltage v denotes the pho-
ton number m which is detected by a common photodiode.
Two comparators would output “11” when v ∈ [v1, v2], which
means the photon number m at P4 falls in [m1,m2] where m1
and m2 correspond to v1 and v2, respectively.
To discuss the position and transmittance of “untagged bits”
in the passive scheme of a two-threshold detection mode, we
consider three cases according to different parameters of the
beam splitter (BS), attenuator, and detector in Fig. 2.
Case I (tBtD = 1 − tB): The “untagged bits” are redefined as
the photon pulses with photon number n5 ∈ [m1,m2]
at P5 in Fig. 2. Thus, the lower probability bound of
1−δ
(
=
∑m2
n5=m1 P(n5)
)
of the “untagged bits” needs to be
estimated. Note that tBtD = 1−tB, P(n5) (= B[P(n1), (1−
tB)]) at P5 is equal to D(m) (= B[P(n1), tBtD]) at P4 in
Fig. 2. Thus, 1 − δ is estimated by ∑m2m=m1 D(m) and
λA = λ.
Case II (λ ≤ tBtD/(1 − tB) < 1): The attenuator λ in Fig. 2
is virtually replaced by two cascaded attenuators λ′
[= tBtD/(1 − tB)] and λ′′ (= λ/λ′), in which the secu-
rity is not reduced. A virtual passive scheme [Fig. 4(a)]
is equivalent to that of Fig. 2 because the PND at P1 is
the same as that at P2, P3, P4, P5 and P6 in both passive
schemes. Note that λ′′ ≤ 1 requires λ ≤ tBtD/(1− tB) for
the BB84 protocol and λd < λs ≤ tBtD/(1 − tB) for the
decoy-state protocol. In Fig. 4(a), the “untagged bits”
are defined as the photon pulses with photon number
n7 ∈ [m1,m2] at P7. Thus, the lower probability bound
of 1 − δ
(
=
∑m2
n7=m1
P(n7)
)
of “untagged bits” needs to
be estimated. Note that tBtD = (1 − tB)λ′, P(n7) at P7 is
equal to D(m) at P4 in Fig. 4(a). Thus, 1−δ is estimated
by ∑m2m=m1 D(m) and λA = λ′′ = (1 − tB)λ/(tBtD).
Case III (tBtD > 1 − tB): The BS in Fig. 2 is virtually re-
placed by two beam splitters (BS1 and BS2) and a beam
4FIG. 4: The virtual passive schemes equivalent to Fig. 2 for Cases II and III. (a) Both λ′ (= tBtD/(1 − tB)) and λ′′ (= λ/λ′) are the cascaded
attenuators which replace λ of Fig. 2. (b) BS1: beam splitter (transmittance, 1 − tBtD); BS2: beam splitter (transmittance, (1 − tB)/(tBtD)); BC:
beam combiner. BS1, BS2 and BC replace the BS of Fig. 2.
combiner (BC) [Fig. 4(b)] because the PND at P1 is the
same as that at P2, P3, P4, P5 and P6 in both passive
schemes. In Fig. 4(b), the “untagged bits” are defined
as the photon pulses with photon number n7 ∈ [m1,m2]
at P7. Note that P(n7) at P7 is equal to D(m) at P4 in
Fig. 4(b). Thus, the lower probability bound of 1 − δ(
=
∑m2
n7=m1
P(n7)
)
of the “untagged bits” is estimated by∑m2
m=m1
D(m) and λA = (1 − tB)λ/(tBtD).
The general form of λA for the above cases is thus (1 −
tB)λ/(tBtD), which is also derived in [43]. Note that, in our
method, the lower bound of ∑m2m=m1 D(m) should be estimated
by the measured data from the detection mode shown in Fig. 3.
A. PNA without detection noise
Let the random variable R = 1 denote that C1 and C2 out-
put “11”, otherwise R = 0. Thus, R follows the binomial
distribution B (1, p). Without any detection noise in Fig. 3,
p =
∑m2
m=m1
D(m) = 1 − δ. After M repeating measurements,
let the random variable X = k denote k measurements finding
R = 1 and then X follows the binomial distribution B (M, p).
Statistically, k/M fluctuates around p. To estimate the statisti-
cal fluctuation, we give the following Lemma.
Lemma. (Clopper-Pearson Confidence Interval [38, 39])
Let X be the number of successes in M Bernoulli trials with
probability p of success on each trial. The Clopper-Pearson
(1 − α) confidence interval for p is obtained as follows: If
X = x is observed, then the lower and upper bounds pl(x, α)
and pu(x, α), respectively, are defined by
M∑
j=x
(
M
j
)
p jl (x, α)
[
1 − pl(x, α)]M− j = α2 , (1 ≤ x ≤ M);
x∑
j=0
(
M
j
)
p ju(x, α)
[
1 − pu(x, α)]M− j = α2 , (0 ≤ x ≤ M − 1);
pl(0, α) = 0, pu(M, α) = 1. (9)
Obviously, from the Lemma, one has
Prob(pl(k, α) ≤ p ≤ pu(k, α)) = 1 − α. (10)
Thus, 1−δ or p can be lower bounded by pl(k, α) with a confi-
dence level 1−α, while pl(k, α) can be easily calculated using
the MATLAB program.
B. PNA with known and additive detection noise
In practice, some detection noise exists in Fig. 3 and affects
the estimation of 1− δ. Here, it is supposed that the properties
of detection noise are known by Alice and are independent
of signal detection. Two kinds of noise are mainly concerned.
One is Poissonian noise or dark counts from the detector itself.
The other is Gaussian electronic noise generated by electronic
devices such as the integrator and comparators in Fig. 3. Let
the random variables m′, m and d (or x) be measured data,
true photon number, and additive Poissonian noise (Gaussian
electronic noise) and satisfy
m′ = m + d, m′ = m + x. (11)
5For the Poissonian noise d of the probability N(d) =
exp(−γ)γd/d!, based on Eq. (11), one yields
P(m1 ≤ m′ ≤ m2) =
m1−1∑
m=0
D(m)
m2−m∑
d=m1−m
N(d)
+
m2∑
m=m1
D(m)
m2−m∑
d=0
N(d). (12)
Let
b(m1,m2) = max

m2−m∑
d=m1−m
N(d),m = 0, . . . ,m1 − 1
 ,
b(m2) =
m2∑
d=0
N(d).
(13)
Note that b(m2) ≥ b(m1,m2). Combining Eqs. (12) and (13),
one has
P(m1 ≤ m′ ≤ m2) ≤ b(m1,m2)
m1−1∑
m=0
D(m) + b(m2)
m2∑
m=m1
D(m)
≤ b(m1,m2)

m1−1∑
m=0
D(m) +
∞∑
m=m2+1
D(m)
 + b(m2)
m2∑
m=m1
D(m)
= b(m1,m2)
1 −
m2∑
m=m1
D(m)
 + b(m2)
m2∑
m=m1
D(m), (14)
which gives
1 − δ =
m2∑
m=m1
D(m) ≥ P(m1 ≤ m
′ ≤ m2) − b(m1,m2)
b(m2) − b(m1,m2)
. (15)
After M measurements of m′, if one finds k′ events from the
binomial distribution B(M, p′), according to the Lemma,
Prob(pl(k′, α) ≤ p′ ≤ pu(k′, α)) = 1 − α, (16)
where p′ = P(m1 ≤ m′ ≤ m2). From Eqs. (15) and (16), 1 − δ
can be lower bounded by
1 − δ ≥ pl(k
′, α) − b(m1,m2)
b(m2) − b(m1,m2)
(17)
with a confidence level 1 − α.
For the case of electronic noise x of the Gaussian probabil-
ity G(x) = (2piσ2)−1/2 exp [ − x2/(2σ2)], based on Eq. (11),
one yields
P(m1 ≤ m′ ≤ m2) =
m1−1∑
m=0
D(m)
∫ m2−m
m1−m
G(x)dx
+
m2∑
m=m1
D(m)
∫ m2−m
m1−m
G(x)dx +
∞∑
m=m2+1
D(m)
∫ m2−m
m1−m
G(x)dx
≤
m1−1∑
m=0
D(m)
∫ m2−m1
0
G(x)dx +
m2∑
m=m1
D(m)
∫ (m2−m1)/2
−(m2−m1)/2
G(x)dx
+
∞∑
m=m2+1
D(m)
∫ −1
m1−m2−1
G(x)dx. (18)
To derive the above inequality, the property that G(x) is single-
peak function symmetrical at zero is used. Let
b1 =
∫ m2−m1
0
G(x)dx, b2 =
∫ (m2−m1)/2
−(m2−m1)/2
G(x)dx,
b3 =
∫ −1
m1−m2−1
G(x)dx,
(19)
and b2 ≥ b1 ≥ b3. Equation (18) then changes to
P(m1 ≤ m′ ≤ m2)
≤ b1

m1−1∑
m=0
D(m)
 + b2

m2∑
m=m1
D(m)
 + b3

∞∑
m=m2+1
D(m)

≤ b1

m1−1∑
m=0
D(m) +
∞∑
m=m2+1
D(m)
 + b2

m2∑
m=m1
D(m)

= b1
1 −
m2∑
m=m1
D(m)
 + b2

m2∑
m=m1
D(m)
 . (20)
Thus, we get
1 − δ =
m2∑
m=m1
D(m) ≥ P(m1 ≤ m
′ ≤ m2) − b1
b2 − b1
. (21)
Similar to Eq. (17), 1 − δ can be lower bounded by
1 − δ ≥ pl(k
′, α) − b1
b2 − b1
(22)
with a confidence level 1 − α.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Based on the BB84 protocol, Fig. 5 shows the numerical
simulation results for a trusted source and an untrusted source
with an APN monitor and PNA. In the simulations, both the
trusted and untrusted sources are of Poissonian PND. The
APN (µ) of the untrusted source is 106. We use the passive
scheme of tB = 0.9 and tD = 0.76 to implement the APN
monitor and PNA without considering statistical fluctuation
and detection noise. Figure 5(a) shows the result with the
experimental parameters in [44] (see Table I), where ηB is
the efficiency of Bob’s detection, Y0 is the dark-count rate
of Bob’s detector, and edet (e0) is the probability that a pho-
ton (dark count) hit the erroneous detector in Bob’s side. In
Fig. 5(a), we choose the optimized value of η = (ηBη f )/µ for
both the trusted and untrusted sources, f (Ee) = 1 for perfect
error correction and [m1,m2] = [677160, 690840] for the de-
tection thresholds in Fig. 3. Qe and Ee are given by [19]
Qe = Y0 + 1 − exp(−µηηBη f ),
Ee =
e0Y0 + edet[1 − exp(−µηηBη f )]
Qe .
(23)
Note that, from Fig. 5(a), no secure key rate with an APN
monitor is generated at any distance, while the secure key rate
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The simulations of the BB84 protocol for the
trusted source and untrusted source with the APN monitor and PNA.
(a) η = (ηBη f )/µ and parameters in [44] are used. (b) η = 10−7,
ηB = 0.5 and other parameters are the same as [44].
TABLE I: The simulation parameters for Fig. 5(a).
µ tB tD ηB α′ Y0 edet e0
106 0.9 0.76 0.045 0.21 1.7 × 10−6 3.3% 0.5
with PNA is found close to the value of the trusted source.
For comparing the APN monitor with PNA more visibly and
fairly, Fig. 5(b) shows the result with fixing η = 10−7 and re-
setting ηB = 0.5. Other simulation parameters are the same
as those in Table I. Using these parameters, one can fix
Pn2>1 = 0.029843 to calculate the secure key rate with the
APN monitor. From Fig. 5(b), the secure distance is shown
to be less than 1 km with the APN monitor. Fortunately,
PNA improves the performance which approaches that of the
trusted source.
For testing the effects of statistical fluctuation and detec-
tion noise on PNA, we choose an untrusted source of Poisso-
nian statistics to perform the simulations based on the three-
intensity decoy-state protocol. In the passive scheme as in
Fig. 2, tB and tD are chosen as 0.9 and 0.76, respectively. The
APN of the untrusted source is 1.462 × 107. Thus, 〈m〉 at
P4 is 107. For applying the decoy-state protocol, the average
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The simulations of three-intensity decoy-state
protocol for a trusted source and untrusted source with PNA with
different detection noise, run by M = 108 and α = 10−6. (a) Pois-
sonian noise with the average photon number γ = 106, . . . , 7 × 106.
(b) Gaussian electronic noise with variance σ2 = 109, . . . , 7 × 1010.
photon number for a signal (weak decoy) state is νs = 0.5
(νd = 0.1). In doing so, the transmittance of the attenuator
is λs = 3.42 × 10−7 (λd = 6.84 × 10−8) for the signal (weak
decoy) state. The photoelectron detection and additive detec-
tion noise generated in Fig. 3 are simulated using the Monte
Carlo method and M = 108 of measurements are run. Other
parameters are chosen from [44] and summarized in Table II.
With different Poissonian noise (γ = 106, . . . , 7×106) added
in the PNA, each color line in Fig. 6(a) shows the secure
key rate for the untrusted source. For comparison, the black
dashed line shows the secure key rate for the trusted source
with the same setup. Here, the confidence level 1 − α is cho-
sen as 1 − 10−6 and the minimal (maximal) value of detected
m′ is chosen as m1 (m2), by which pl(M, α) = (α/2)1/M can be
substituted to Eq. (17) according to the Lemma.
With different Gaussian electronic noise (σ2 = 109, . . . , 7×
1010) added in PNA, each color line in Fig. 6(b) shows the
secure key rate for untrusted source. The method of choosing
α, m1, and m2 is the same as that of Poissonian noise.
7TABLE II: The simulation parameters for Fig. 6.
νs νd tB tD 〈m〉 M λs λd ηB α′ Y0 edet e0
0.5 0.1 0.9 0.76 107 108 3.42 × 10−7 6.84 × 10−8 0.045 0.21 1.7 × 10−6 3.3% 0.5
V. CONCLUSION
In the passive scheme as in Fig. 2, a different monitor mode
at P4 gives different statistical characteristics of the untrusted
source and affects the performance of the QKD system. It is
shown from Fig. 5 that the PNA can enhance the QKD per-
formance better than the APN monitor because PNA utilizes
the two-threshold detection as in Fig. 3. Asymptotically, if
the photon statistics at P1 can be fully characterized through a
photon-number-resolving (PNR) detector at P3 and the PND
monitor can be realized, the GLLP’s analysis for the trusted
source can be efficiently applied and the results are shown
as the black dashed line in Figs. 5 and 6. Without consid-
ering the statistical fluctuation and detection noise, the secure
key rate through PNA approaches that of an ideal PND mon-
itor except at a long distance. What is more important is that
the two-threshold detection mode of PNA is easier to realize
than the PNR detector. Besides, it is also found from Fig. 6
that too large a random noise added in the PNA’s detection
would degenerate the QKD performance. Thus, for improving
the secure key rate, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in Fig. 3
needs to be kept in an applicable level. For example, in our
simulations, RS Np = 〈m〉/γ and RS Ng = 〈m〉/σ2 can be cal-
culated for Poissonian and Gaussian electronic noise, respec-
tively. From Fig. 6, if the QKD distance would exceed 120
km, then RS Np ≥ 2.5 and RS Ng ≥ 5 × 10−4 are needed and is
achievable in practice. Therefore, the passive scheme with
PNA is highly practical to solve the untrusted source problem
in the “Plug & Play” QKD system.
We remark that the effect of parameter fluctuations has
not yet been included in the security analysis. The effective
method to deal with the parameter fluctuations [25–28] is en-
couraged to be applied in the passive scheme.
Note added. For passive scheme, the security analysis with
considering statistical fluctuation and detection noise for PNA
is given with using different techniques [43].
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